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Electronic Discovery

by K. Alex Khoury*
The most significant developments in electronic discovery (E-Discovery) law in the Eleventh Circuit in 2015 were the latest amendments to
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (Amendments), which went into
effect on December 1, 2015. As with the last round of amendments in
2006, the 2015 Amendments primarily addressed the rapidly expanding
and evolving practice of E-Discovery. Some of the amendments are
minor tweaks to existing rules that will have little or no impact on
current precedent. Other amendments introduce entirely new rules
designed to give the courts and the parties new tools to corral the beast
that is E-Discovery. There is debate over whether the Amendments will
result in any meaningful changes in federal civil practice. Questions
about the efficacy of the Amendments, however, will not be answered
until next year's survey period, when the first wave of district court
opinions applying the new rules start to come down.
I.

E-DISCOVERY

AMENDMENTS TO THE FEDERAL RULES OF CIVIL

PROCEDURE

The 2015 Amendments are underpinned by a familiar theme-the
expense of discovery impedes the resolution of disputes on their merits.
This same mantra was one of the driving considerations for the adoption
of the Federal Rules in 1938.' Prior to the Federal Rules, there was no
consistent mechanism to require a party to exchange evidence with an
opposing party.' Wealthy parties could devote more resources to
* Partner at Balch & Bingham LLP, Atlanta, Georgia. Adjunct Professor of EDiscovery, Walter F. George School of Law, Mercer University. Georgia College & State
University (B.S., 1994); Mercer University, Walter F. George School of Law (J.D., cum
laude, 2003). Member, State Bar of Georgia.
The author would like to thank Sean Leonard for his invaluable assistance in preparing
this Article. Sean is an E-Discovery specialist at Siemens.
1. John H. Beisner, Discovering a Better Way: The Need for Effective Civil Litigation
Reform, 60 DuKE L. J. 547, 556 (2010).
2. Id. at 555.
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discovery and thus have an unfair advantage in the "trial[] by ambush"
environment of the day.' That imbalance, it was argued, dissuaded less
affluent parties from pursuing meritorious claims.' To level the playing
field, the drafters adopted rule-based discovery.'
Seventy-seven years later, the exponential growth of data creation and
retention is driving rising discovery costs and delaying the determination
of claims to the point that even wealthy litigants are reticent to see their
claims through to trial.' Thus, the Civil Rules Advisory Committee (the
Committee) set to work once again with the goal of making litigation
accessible to all. As shown below, the Committee used three overriding
strategies to accomplish the goal: (1) restraining the scope of discovery;
(2) encouraging active case management by the courts; and (3) encouraging more cooperation between the parties.'
Rule 1 - Aspiration for Cooperation
The drafters amended Rule 18 to set the tone for the rest of the 2015
Amendments. Prior to amendment, the rule admonished that the
Federal Rules were to be "construed and administered to secure the just,
speedy, and inexpensive determination of every action and proceeding."'
Rule 1 was silent, however, as to who was responsible for construing and
administering the rules to obtain these lofty goals.'o The Committee
Note following the 1993 amendment to Rule 1 clarified that the court
and attorneys, as officers of the court, have the duty to administer the
Rules for the just, speedy, and inexpensive determination of claims."
The 2015 Amendment makes clear the "court[s] and the parties" are
responsible for using the rules to obtain just, speedy, and inexpensive
results. 2 The Committee Notes provided that the drafters did not
intend the amendment to Rule 1 to create any new obligations on the
parties but rather intended to encourage the parties to cooperate in
furtherance of the goals of Rule 1.

A.

3. Id. at 556.
4. Id.
5. Id.
6. Id. at 567.
7. FED. R. CIv.
8. FED. R. CIv.
9. FED. R. Civ.
10. See id.
11. FED. R. Civ.
12. FED. R. Civ.
13. FED. R. Civ.

P. 1 Advisory Committee's note to 2015 amendment.
P. 1.
P. 1 (2014).
P. 1 Advisory Committee's note to 1993 amendment.
P. 1.
P. 1 Advisory Committee's note to 2015 amendment.
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Rule 16-Early, Direct Communication

Rule 1614 addresses case management by the courts. The intent of
Rule 16 is "to encourage the active judicial management of the case
development process."" The amendments to Rule 16 show a strong
desire to get judges communicating with parties on E-Discovery topics
earlier in the case." This theme runs throughout the 2015 Amendments.
The first change to Rule 16 appears in subdivision (b)(1)(B), which
previously allowed judges to conduct a scheduling conference "after
consulting with the parties' attorneys and any unrepesented parties ...
by telephone, mail, or other means." The Committee deleted the "by
telephone, mail, or other means" language, noting that "[a] scheduling
conference is more effective if the court and parties engage in direct
Under the new rule, scheduling
simultaneous communication." 8
conferences should "be held in person, by telephone, or by more
sophisticated electronic means."
Next, the Committee set about encouraging the court and the parties
to engage in "direct simultaneous communication" earlier in the case.2 0
Under the amended Rule 16(b)(2), the court must issue a scheduling
order within the earlier of 90 days (formerly 120 days) after any
defendant has been served with the complaint or 60 days (formerly 90
days) after any defendant has appeared. 2 ' Thus, new Rule 16(b)(2)
lessens the maximum time the court has to issue its scheduling order by
thirty days. However, the new Rule 16(b)(2) gives courts the discretion
to extend the time for issuing a scheduling order for good cause.'
To get the court and the parties talking about E-Discovery, the
Committee added three new items to the list of subjects that may be
included in scheduling orders. 23 First, scheduling orders may now
address the "preservation" of electronically stored information (ESI) in
addition to its disclosure and discovery.' By encouraging the court and
the parties to discuss preservation of ESI early in the case, the

14.
15.
16.
17.
18.
19.
20.
21.
22.
23.
24.

FED. R. Civ. P. 16.
JAMES WM. MOORE ET AL., MOORE'S FED. PRACTICE ch. 16, at 16-1 (3d ed. 2016).
Id.
FED. R. CIV. P. 16(b)(1)(B) (2014).
FED. R. Civ. P. 16(b)(1)(B) Advisory Committee's note to 2015 amendment.
See id.
Id.
Compare FED. R. Civ. P. 16(b)(2) (2014), with FED. CIV. P. 16(b)(2).
FED. R. Civ. P. 16(b)(2).
FED. R. CIV. P. 16 Advisory Committee's note to 2015 amendment.
FED. R. CIV. P. 16(b)(3)(B)(iii).
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Committee hopes to reduce the frequency of spoliation motions.25
Second, revised Rule 16(b)(3) permits scheduling orders to include
F.R.E. 502
Federal Rule of Evidence (F.R.E.) 502 agreements.2 6
agreements allow parties to inadvertently produce privileged information
without waiving the applicable privilege.2 7 These types of agreements
are essential in E-Discovery because they reduce the risk of privilege
waiver in large document productions-a risk that significantly adds to
the cost and delay of document reviews.28 Third, the new Rule 16(b)(3)
allows the court to require parties to request a conference with the court
before filing discovery motions. 2 9 This addition encourages judges and
parties to talk about discovery disputes before plunging into contentious
motions practice."o All three additions to Rule 16(b)(3) encourage the
court and the parties to discuss discovery concerns early in the case to
reduce protracted and expensive motions practice later.
Looking deeper, the Committee amended Rule 16 to create opportunities for the court and the parties to reach agreement on E-Discovery
topics before the parties become entrenched in discovery battles."' This
type of "cooperation" is the most effective means of controlling the
escalating costs and delays caused by E-Discovery and is in keeping with
the spirit of Rule 1. Whether the courts and the parties will take
advantage of these opportunities remains to be seen.
C.

Rule 26-The Scope of Discovery Redefined

Rule 2632 received some of the most significant, and controversial,
changes of the 2015 Amendments. In particular, the amendment of Rule
26(b)(1) redefined the scope of discovery.
Amended Rule 26(b)(1) provides as follows:
Unless otherwise limited by court order, the scope of discovery is as
follows: Parties may obtain discovery regarding any nonprivileged

25. FED. R. CIv. P. 16 Advisory Committee's note to 2015 amendment. The
Committee's inclusion of "preservation" as a topic for inclusion in discovery plans and
scheduling orders. See FED. R. Civ. P. 26(f)(3)(C) Advisory Committee's note to 2015
amendment. Collectively, these amendments encourage the court and the parties to define
the scope of the duty to preserve early in the case rather than in spoliation sanctions
motions later in discovery. See FED. R. Civ. P. 37(e) Advisory Committee's note to 2015
amendment.
26. FED. R. CIv. P. 16(b)(3)(B)(iv).
27. FED. R. EVID. 502.
28. FED. R. EVID. 502 Advisory Committee's note to 2007 amendment.
29. FED. R. Civ. P. 16(b)(3)(B)(v).
30. FED. R. CIv. P. 16 Advisory Committee's note to 2015 amendment.
31. Id.
32. FED. R. Civ. P. 26.
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matter that is relevant to any party's claim or defense and proportional
to the needs of the case, considering the importance of the issues at
stake in the action, the amount in controversy, the parties' relative
access to relevant information, the parties' resources, the importance
of the discovery in resolving the issues, and whether the burden or
expense of the proposed discovery outweighs its likely benefit.
Information within this scope of discovery need not be admissible in
evidence to be discoverable."
Put simply, the scope of discovery is now defined as any non-privileged
matter that is relevant to any party's claim or defense and proportional
to the needs of the case."
Proportionality is determined by examination of six factors, which,
with the exception of the third factor-the parties' relative access to
relevant information-are not new concepts.3 ' The Federal Rules have
used the proportionality factors to limit the scope of discovery for more
than thirty years.36 The factors first appeared in the 1983 amendments
to the Federal Rules when the Committee inserted the following
language directly into Rule 26(b)(1):
The frequency or extent of use of the discovery . . . shall be limited by
the court if it determines that: (i) the discovery sought is unreasonably
cumulative or duplicative, or is obtainable from some other source that
is more convenient, less burdensome, or less expensive; (ii) the party
seeking discovery has had ample opportunity by discovery in the action
to obtain the information sought; or (iii) the discovery is unduly
burdensome or expensive, taking into account the needs of the case, the
amount in controversy, limitations on the parties' resources, and the
importance of the issues at stake in the litigation."
In the 1993 amendments, the Committee moved the proportionality
factors into a newly created subdivision, Rule 26(b)(2), for "ease of

33. FED. R. CIv. P. 26(b)(1).
34. Id.
35. Id. The third proportionality factor, relative access to the information, is an EDiscovery-inspired factor meant to consider the problems caused by asymmetry
information, which can take several forms. FED. R. Civ. P. 26 Advisory Committee's note
to 2015 amendment. In the Notes, the Committee specifically addresses what is commonly
called "volume asymmetry," which exists when one party has far more discoverable
information than the other party and, therefore, bears a far greater burden in discovery.
Id. Although not mentioned in the Committee Notes, another type of asymmetry that
could impact a court's proportionality analysis is knowledge asymmetry, which results
when one party has disproportionately more knowledge about the existence or location of
relevant data. Id.
36. FED. R. CIv. P. 26 Advisory Committee's note to 2015 amendment.
37. FED. R. CIv. P. 26(b)(1) (1983).
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reference."" Finding courts did not employ the proportionality factors
to limit discovery as robustly as anticipated, the Committee amended
Rule 26(b)(1) in 2000 to add the line: "All discovery is subject to the
limitations imposed by Rule 26(b)(2)(i), (ii), and (iii)."" In 2006, the
Committee moved the proportionality factors down in the rules again,
this time to Rule 26(b)(2)(C), to make room for the newly created Rule
26(b)(2)(B) concerning information not reasonably accessible.4 0 This
drifting away of the proportionality factors from Rule 26(b)(1) may be
one of the reasons courts and parties have not viewed the factors as an
integral part of the scope of discovery.4 ' The return of the proportionality factors to Rule 26(b)(1) in the 2015 Amendments is not a new
limitation on the scope of discovery; it is an attempt to get the courts
and the parties to recognize proportionality as the limit on discovery it
was always intended to be.42
Although proportionality is one of the controversial buzzwords
associated with the 2015 Amendments, new Rule 26(b)(1) is perhaps
more notable for the language that was removed than for the language
put back in.
Most notably, any reference to subject matter discovery
is gone." From 1946 until 1993, Rule 26(b)(1) defined the scope of
discovery to include "any matter, not privileged, which is relevant to the
subject matter involved in the pending action, whether it relates to the
claim or defense of the party seeking discovery or to the claim or defense
of any other party."4 1 In 2000, the Committee separated the concepts
of information relevant to the subject matter of the action and information relevant to the parties' claims and defenses. 46 The Committee
changed the scope of discovery language to include "any matter, not
privileged, that is relevant to the claim or defense of any party"4 and
reworded and relocated the reference to subject matter discovery by
inserting "[flor good cause, the court may order discovery of any matter
relevant to the subject matter involved in the action" later in the

38. FED. R. Civ. P. 26(b) Advisory Committee's note to 1993 amendment.
39. FED. R. CIv. P. 26(b)(1) (2000).
40. FED. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(2)(C) (2006).
41. See FED. R. Civ. P. 26(b) Advisory Committee's note to 2015 amendment (noting
that the 1993 relegation to subpart (b) may have "softened" the focus on the proportionality
factors).
42. FED. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(1) Advisory Committee's note to 2015 amendment.
43. See FED. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(1).
44. Id.
45. Compare FED. R. CIv. P. 26(b) (1946 Amendment), with FED. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(1)
(1993 Amendment).
46. FED. R. CIv. P. 26(b)(1) (2000 Amendment).
47. Id.
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subsection."
By requiring a showing of good cause to authorize
discovery beyond what is relevant to the parties' claims or defenses,
namely subject matter discovery, the Committee hoped to "involve the
court more actively in regulating the breadth of sweeping or contentious
discovery."
In the 2015 Amendments, the Committee rejected the
distinction between information relevant to the subject matter of the
action and information relevant to the parties' claims and defenses.o
The Committee stated, "Proportional discovery relevant to any party's
claim or defense suffices, given a proper understanding of what is
relevant to a claim or defense."" In the Committee's eyes, at least,
relevant and proportional subject matter discovery is still available
under the new Rule 26(b)(1), even though the "subject matter" language
is gone.52
Also gone is the talismanic phrase "reasonably calculated to lead to
the discovery of admissible evidence."" The phrase was introduced into
the Federal Rules by the 1946 amendments to make clear that discovery
was not limited by the admissibility of the evidence sought.
Since
then, the phrase has been used incorrectly by some to define the scope
of discovery." Attempting to eliminate the misuse of the phrase to
expand the scope of discovery, the Committee replaced it with a more
concise statement of the original intent: "Information within this scope
of discovery need not be admissible in evidence to be discoverable.""
Less controversial than the overhaul of Rule 26(b)(1) is the authorization under Rule 26(c)(1)(B) for the courts to allocate the expenses of
discovery when issuing protective orders." Courts have long had the
authority to shift costs in discovery.1 8 The Committee elected to make
that authority explicit in the Rules to "forestall the temptation some
parties may feel to contest this authority."5 9

48. Id.
49. FED. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(1) Advisory Committee's note to 2000 amendment.
50. FED. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(1) Advisory Committee's note to 2015 amendment.
51. Id.
52. Id.
53. FED. R. Civ. P. 26 Advisory Committee's note to 2015 amendment.
54. Report of Advisory Committee on Rules for Civil Procedure, Proposed Amendments
to Rules of Civil Procedure for the District Courts of the United States 32-33 (June 1946).
The phrase appeared in the 1946 amendment to Rule 26(b), which at the time governed
depositions only, but was incorporated by reference into Rules 33 and 34. Id. at 47-53.
55. FED. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(1) Advisory Committee's note to 2015 amendment.
56. FED. R. CIv. P. 26(b)(1).
57. FED. R. Civ. P. 26(c)(1)(B).
58. See Oppenheimer Fund, Inc. v. Sanders, 437 U.S. 340, 358 (1978).
59. FED. R. Civ. P. 26(c)(1)(B) Advisory Committee's note to 2015 amendment.
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Another significant change to Rule 26 is the creation of Rule 26(d)(2),
which allows parties to deliver Rule 340 document requests earlier.
Under this new Rule, a party may deliver document requests to another
party more than twenty-one days after that party has been served with
a summons and complaint, but prior to the Rule 26(f) meet and
confer.6 2 Requests delivered early under this Rule are not considered
served, however, until the first Rule 26(f) conference.6 ' The goal of this
amendment is to allow the parties to engage in informed and, therefore,
more meaningful exchanges about discovery at the Rule 26(f) conference. 6 4 This amendment is another example of the Committee encouraging earlier dialogue about discovery in the hope of avoiding unnecessary discovery disputes.
D.

Rule 34-Improving Responses to Document Requests

The 2015 Amendments to Rule 34 target three common practices that
routinely result in unnecessary discovery disputes: (1) boilerplate
objections; (2) failure to produce documents when they are due; and (3)
failure to indicate whether documents are being withheld due to an
objection.6 ' As amended, Rule 34(b)(2)(B) requires parties to either
allow the inspection of the evidence as requested or "state with
specificity the grounds for objecting to the request, including the
reasons." 66 The amendment outlaws boilerplate discovery objections by
requiring objecting parties to state the factual basis for all objections.6 7
This change addresses one of the primary complaints of the opponents
to the amendments to Rule 26(b)(1), who argued that including the
proportionality factors within the scope of discovery would result in a
new boilerplate objection for proportionality.6 8 It also has the effect of

60. FED. R. Civ. P. 34.
61. FED. R. Civ. P. 26(d)(2).
62. Id.
63. Id.
64. See FED. R. Civ. P. 26(d)(2) Advisory Committee's note to 2015 amendment.
65. FED. R. CIv. P. 34 Advisory Committee's note to 2015 amendment.
66. FED. R. Civ. P. 34(b)(2)(B).
67. Id. Many federal circuit courts, including the Eleventh Circuit, frowned upon
boilerplate objections already. See, e.g., Panola Land Buyers Ass'n v. Shuman, 762 F.2d
1550, 1559 (11th Cir. 1985) (holding "[t]o be adequate, objections which serve as the basis
of a motion for protective order under Fed.R.Civ.P. 26 should be plain enough and specific
enough so that the court can understand in what way the interrogatories are alleged to be
objectionable.") (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Davis v. Fendler, 650 F.2d
1154, 1160 (9th Cir. 1981)).
68. FED. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(1) Advisory Committee's note to 2015 amendment. The
Committee addressed this argument in its Notes for Rule 26(b)(1), stating: "Nor is the
change intended to permit the opposing party to refuse discovery simply by making a
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informing opposing counsel as to why the party deemed the request
objectionable, which could allow for constructive discussion and
compromise.6
The new Rule 34(b)(2)(B) also requires document production to be
completed by the time specified in the request "or another reasonable
time specified in the response."7 o This amendment prohibits the
practice of providing a written response to a document request at the
deadline for production stating documents will be produced at the
dreaded "mutually convenient time."" A party needing more than
thirty days to review and produce documents, which is not uncommon
in cases with large volumes of ESI, can produce documents after the
production period but must specify when production will occur in its
written response. 72 This requirement is a well-conceived safety valve
that recognizes the challenges of E-Discovery, but it anticipates
producing parties being able to plan large document productions with
some degree of specificity." Parties well versed in E-Discovery project
management will have no difficulty complying with the revised Rule, but
for others, projecting production dates will be an inexact science that
could frustrate the Rule's intent.
The Committee also revised Rule 34(b)(2)(C) to require parties
asserting objections to "state whether any responsive materials are being
withheld on the basis of that objection."7 ' This amendment targets the
practice of "belt and suspenders" objection tactics whereby a party raises
every conceivable objection, usually without much knowledge of the
documents being sought, just in case there is a document in the
collection to which one of the objections might apply." As the Committee notes, confusion "arises when a producing party states several
objections and still produces information, leaving the requesting party
uncertain whether any relevant and responsive information has been

boilerplate objection that it is not proportional." Id.
69. See id.
70. FED. R. Civ. P. 34(b)(2)(B).
71. Robert K. Wise, Ending Evasive Responsiveness to Written Discovery:A Guide for
Properly Responding (and Objecting) to Interrogatoriesand Document Requests Under the
Texas Discovery Rules, 65 BAYLOR L. REV. 510, 568 (2013).
72. FED. R. Civ. P. 34(b)(2)(B).
73. See FED. R. CIV. P. 34(b)(2)(B) Advisory Committee's note to 2015 amendment
(discussing staged document productions and suggesting parties should "specify the
beginning and end dates of the production").
74. See id.
75, FED. R. CIv. P. 34(b)(2)(C).
76. FED. R. CIv. P. 34(b)(2)(C) Advisory Committee's note to 2015 amendment.
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withheld on the basis of the objections."" It is not unheard of to file
motions to compel over objections for which no documents have actually
been withheld.7 " By requiring a party to state whether it is withholding documents on the basis of an objection, this Rule should eliminate
such an unnecessary waste of time and resources." Like the previous
change to Rule 34(b)(2)(B), this rule requires the producing party to
learn more information about its documents within the thirty-day
response period than may have been their custom.o Conforming
practices to these new rules will not be without challenges, and
knowledge of E-Discovery work flows will be at a premium.
E.

Rule 37-Spoliation Revisited
The 2015 Amendments to Rule 37(08

regarding the failure to

preserve ESI are another set of hot-button changes to the Rules that
faced determined opposition.82 The previous version of the rule,
adopted in 2006, provided that "[albsent exceptional circumstances, a
court may not impose sanctions under these rules on a party for failing
to provide electronically stored information lost as a result of the
routine, good-faith operation of an electronic information system."13
The 2006 rule recognized the traditional spoliation analysis used for
hard copy documents was not appropriate for E-Discovery because of the
unique nature of ESI, which is routinely altered or deleted through
ordinary computer usage, absent any culpable conduct."
The Committee believed the the 2006 version of Rule 37(f) was
unsuccessful at reducing the related problems of excessive spoliation
litigation and over-preservation of data to avoid spoliation litigation
because of a circuit split over the level of culpability required to trigger
the most severe sanctions." As a result, the Committee scrapped the
77. Id.
78. Id.
79. Id.
80. Id.
81. FED. R. Civ. P. 37(f).
82. See, e.g., Beisner, supra note 1, at 590-91.
83. FED. R. Civ. P. 37(f) (2006).
84. FED. R. Civ. P. 37(f) Advisory Committee's note to 2006 amendment.
85. FED. R. Civ. P. 37(e) Advisory Committee's note to 2015 amendment. Some circuits
have held negligence is sufficient to trigger adverse inference instructions. See Talavera
v. Shah, 638 F.3d 303, 312 (D.C. Cir. 2011); United States v. Laurent, 607 F.3d 895, 902-03
(1st Cir. 2010); Beaven v. U.S. Dep't of Just., 622 F.3d 540, 554 (6th Cir. 2010); Residential
Funding v. DeGeorge Fin. Corp., 306 F.3d 99, 113 (2d Cir. 2002); Glover v. BIC Corp., 6
F.3d 1318, 1327 (9th Cir. 1993). Other circuits have required a finding of bad faith or
intent-to-deprive to trigger severe sanctions. See Dalcour v. City of Lakewood, 429 F. App'x
924, 937 (10th Cir. 2012); Sherman v. Rinchem Co., 687 F.3d 996, 1006 (8th Cir. 2012);
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2006 version of Rule 37(f) and created the new Rule 37(e)," which
provides:
If electronically stored information that should have been preserved in
the anticipation or conduct of litigation is lost because a party failed to
take reasonable steps to preserve it, and it cannot be restored or
replaced through additional discovery, the court:
(1) upon finding prejudice to another party from loss of the information, may order measures no greater than necessary to cure the
prejudice; or
(2) only upon finding that the party acted with the intent to deprive
another party of the information's use in the litigation may:
(A) presume that the lost information was unfavorable to the party;
(B) instruct the jury that it may or must presume the information
was unfavorable to the party; or
7
(C) dismiss the action or enter a default judgment.1
Under the new Rule, spoliation sanctions are only available if (1)
relevant ESI that should have been preserved in anticipation of
litigation, (2) is lost, (3) by a party who failed to take reasonable steps
to preserve it, and (4) the lost ESI cannot be replaced through additional
discovery." This safe harbor from spoliation sanctions is significant
because it signals that the rule does not impose strict liability for lost
ESI. It also incentivizes parties to take reasonable steps to preserve
data." The Committee made clear in its notes that "'reasonable steps'
to preserve suffice; [Rule 37(e)'s safe harbor] does not call for perfecIn evaluating reasonableness of preservation efforts, the
tion."o
Committee advises courts to consider the party's resources, proportionali91
ty, and whether the loss of ESI was beyond the party's control.
If a party fails to take reasonable steps to preserve ESI that should
have been preserved and the ESI is lost, the court must determine if
additional discovery can restore or replace the lost ESI." If the lost

Rutledge v. NCL (Bahamas), Ltd., 464 F. App'x 825, 829 (11th Cir. 2012); Faas v. Sears,
Roebuck & Co., 532 F.3d 633, 644 (7th Cir. 2008); Russell v. Univ. of Tex., 234 F. App'x
195, 207-08 (5th Cir. 2007); Hodge v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 360 F.3d 446, 450-51 (4th Cir.
2004).
86. FED. R. CIv. P. 37(e).
87. Id.
88. Id.
89. Id.
90. FED. R. Civ. P. 37(e) Advisory Committee's note to 2015 amendment.
91. Id.
92. ESI can often be recovered from alternative sources. For example, a lost email can
sometimes be recovered by a subpoena to a non-party recipient, deleted files may exist on
backup media or in unallocated sections (a/k/a "Slack Space") on a hard drive, and in some
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ESI can be replaced, no sanctions are permitted under Rule 37(e), even
if the party that lost the ESI destroyed it intentionally." However, if
the lost ESI cannot be replaced, and a party has been prejudiced by the
loss, the court is authorized to order curative measures no greater than
necessary to cure the prejudice." The Rule does not otherwise limit
the courts' ability to fashion remedial measures, leaving the court with
discretion to craft creative curative measures appropriate to the facts
and circumstances of the case."
So-called "case killer" sanctions-adverse inference instructions,
dismissal of claims, and default judgment-are available only in cases
in which ESI that should have been preserved was lost by a party with
the specific intent to deprive another party of the use of the information
in the litigation.9 6 Notably, the imposition of case-killing sanctions
does not require a finding of prejudice." The Committee explained that
a finding of prejudice is unnecessary under Rule 37(e)(2) because a
"finding of intent required by the subdivision can support not only an
inference that the lost information was unfavorable to the party that
intentionally destroyed it, but also an inference that the opposing party
was prejudiced by the loss of information that would have favored its
position."" The Committee urged the courts to administer the sanctions in Rule 37(e)(2) with caution, noting a finding of intent to deprive
does not always require the imposition of the most severe sanctions."
II.

CASE LAW DEVELOPMENTS

The 2015 Amendments are game changers for many of the most
litigated aspects of E-Discovery, most notably, spoliation."oo Thus, the
precedential value of many of the E-Discovery opinions issued in 2015
is somewhat diminished. Nevertheless, a few E-Discovery cases in the
Eleventh Circuit in 2015 merit consideration, even as cases employing
the newly-amended Rules start to come down from the courts.

instances, testimony may suffice to replace the missing ESI.
93. FED. R. CIv. P. 37 Advisory Committee's note to 2015 amendment.
94. Id.
95. Id.
96. FED. R. CIv. P. 37(e)(2).
97. FED. R. CIv. P. 37(e)(2) Advisory Committee's note to 2015 amendment.
98. Id.
99. Id.
100. Id.
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Proportionality

One case within the Eleventh Circuit this survey period-In re: Blue
Cross Blue Shield Antitrust Litigation'0 -applied the proportionality
factors set forth in the amended Rule 26(b)(1).102 The plaintiffs in this
case sought to discover expert reports and deposition transcripts from
other, unrelated lawsuits filed against defendant Blue Cross Blue Shield
of Michigan (BCBS). BCBS argued the reports and transcripts were
beyond the revised scope of discovery because they did not involve the
facts of the instant litigation.1 0 3 The court rejected BCBS's argument
as too narrow an interpretation of Rule 26(b)(1), finding that the revised
scope of discovery was not limited to the facts of the case but included
"other 'matters' that remain relevant to a party's claims or defenses,
even if not strictly fact-based."' 04 The court found the reports and
transcripts related to "other incidents of the same type" and thus
satisfied the relevance portion of the discoverability test, despite the
deletion of the reference to "subject matter" discovery.'o
Next, the court applied the proportionality factors.' 6 Considering
the sought-after evidence's importance on the issues at stake in the
action, the court concluded that the reports and transcripts from
unrelated litigation were only "tangentially" important as they addressed
"only a small, secondary issue in this case."1o' Next, the court considered the amount at stake in the litigation and found that the case
involved "perhaps billions of dollars, as well as the continued viability
Considering the
of the Blue Cross-Blue Shield business model."'
parties' relative access to the information, the court concluded the
plaintiffs had no access to the information apart from discovery in this
The court considered the parties' resources but declined to
action.'
weigh that factor in either party's favor because the plaintiffs "seem to
be able to meet the manpower and financial demands of such high-stake
litigation."'o The court also could not determine whether the sought-

101. No. 2:13-CV-20000-RDP, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 174768 (N.D. Ala. Dec. 9, 2015).
102. Id. at *1.
103. Id. at *17-18.
104. Id. at *20.
105. Id. at *19-20 (quoting FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(1) Advisory Committee's note to 2015
amendment).
106. Id. at *20-21.
107. Id. at *21.
108. Id.
109. Id. at *21-22.
110. Id. at *22.
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after discovery was important in resolving issues in the case."'
Finally, the court considered "whether the burden or expense of the
proposed discovery outweigh[ed] its likely benefit.""' The court found
the burden of producing eleven expert reports and eight expert
deposition transcripts was so small that it could not say the burden
outweighed the benefits.1 ' 3 Finding this last element the most persuasive, the court concluded the reports and transcripts were discoverable." 4
Given the type of information at issue in In re Blue Cross Blue Shield,
the opinion does not give much useful guidance on interpreting the
proportionality factors, but it is illustrative of the process for determining discoverability under the new Rule 26(b)(1).1"s
B.

Sanctions

The biggest E-Discovery opinion to come out of the Eleventh Circuit
in this survey period was In re Delta/Airtran Baggage Fee Antitrust
Litigation,"6 in which the court ordered Delta to pay $2,718,795.05 in
This opinion is notable
sanctions for "discovery misconduct." 1
because, despite the large monetary sanction, Delta was not found to
have spoliated evidence."s The court agreed with the special master's
report and recommendation that there was insufficient evidence to
conclude Delta acted in bad faith or lost relevant information."'
Instead, the court sanctioned Delta for a pattern of E-Discovery
incompetence throughout the case. 20 The motion for sanctions decided
in the 2015 opinion was the fourth such motion against Delta in the four
T~ec
121
In each instance, Delta avoided a
years of discovery in the case.
finding of intentional misconduct, but the mistakes continued to pile up.
At issue in the first motion for sanctions was Delta's delay in preserving
emails from certain custodians and turning off its backup tape recycling
program. The second motion for sanctions focused on Delta's collection

111. Id.
112. Id. at *24.
113. Id.
114. Id.
115. Id.
116. No. 1:09-md-2089-TCB, 2015 U.S. App. LEXIS 101474 (11th Cir. Aug. 3, 2015).
117. Id. at *63-64, *79.
118. Id. at *29 (noting that Delta had "dodged the bullet" by getting away with
monetary sanctions because it had narrowly avoided spoliation sanctions for the fourth
time in the litigation).
119. Id. at *26-27.
120. Id. at *28.
121. Id. at *11.

2016]

ELECTRONIC DISCOVERY

873

of ESI from its active email servers and shared network servers only,
overlooking potentially relevant ESI stored on custodians' hard drives,
including archived emails. Delta was sanctioned $1,285,144.13 for these
oversights. The third motion for sanctions targeted Delta for initially
failing to review twenty-nine backup tapes for relevant ESI. Delta was
sanctioned $3,490,520.72 for the mistakes giving rise to the third motion.
The fourth motion for sanctions asserted a number of violations against
Delta, including claims Delta destroyed evidence, concealed or belatedly
produced evidence, made false statements, and continued to withhold
relevant documents. 1 2 2
Although the court failed to find bad faith or intentional misconduct,
it stated: "'[Delta]'s discovery violations have been taxing to plaintiffis]
and the Court, and have expanded this litigation in ways [Delta] still
does not seem to grasp.'123 The court continued, "Delta's discovery
misconduct has rendered the Court's attempts to manage this litigation
and move it toward a resolution on the merits as futile and maddening
as Sisyphus's efforts to roll his boulder to the top of the hill." 2 4
Although the violations giving rise to the sanctions included violations
of Rules 16, 26, and 37, the opinion is really about Delta's frustration of
the directive of Rule 1's directive for the just, speedy, and inexpensive
determination of all claims.1 2 5
III.

CONCLUSION

This survey period will be remembered as the year of the Amendments
to the Federal Rules. With new tools for managing E-Discovery and
clear guidance on sanctions, the courts in the Eleventh Circuit have a
new mandate to rein in the escalating costs and delays caused by EDiscovery, whether caused intentionally or unintentionally by the
parties. Next year's survey period will begin to reveal the true impact
of the 2015 Amendments on E-Discovery practice in the Eleventh
Circuit.

122. Id. at *12-13, *16, *17, *18, *19.
123. Id. at *27 (alterations in original) (quoting SCQuARE Int'l, Ltd. v. BBDO Atlanta,
Inc., No. 1:04-CV-641-JEC, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 5490, at *1, *8 (N.D. Ga. Jan. 25,2008)).
124. Id.
125. Id. at *52; see also FED. R. CIv. P. 1.

